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LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AS MULTI-PRODUCT
FIRMS: AN ECONOMETRIC INvESTIGATION OF
PRODUCTION COSTS*
by
M.N. DARROUGH AND J.M. HEINEKE**
I. INTRODUCTION

In this paper we study the relationship between costs, input prices and activity
levels in a sample of approximately thirty medium sized city police departments for
the years 1968, 69, 71, and 73. Our interest lies in determining the functional
structure of law enforcement production technology.
Since efficient allocation of resources to activities requires knowledge of relative
incremental costs for the activities involved, we are particularly interested in
determining marginal cost functions for, and rates of transformation between the
various outputs. We adopt a quite general functional specification which permits
testing the hypothesis on the underlying technology. In a more general context we
model and estimate the structure of production for a multiple output - multiple
input firm in a manner which places few restrictions on first and second order parameters of the underlying structure.
One question which arises immediately in any discussion of cost or production
functions associated with law enforcement agencies concerns the appropriate
measure of "output". Clearly police departments produce multiple outputs
(services) for a community, ranging from directing traffic, quieting family
squabbles, and providing emergency first aid, to preventing crimes and solving
existing crimes. In this study we view police output as being of essentially two types:
(I) general service activities as epitomized by the traffic control and emergency first
aid care functions of police departments; and (2) activities directed to solving
existing crimes. Strictly speaking, Hsolving existing crimes" may be an intermediate
output with deterrence or prevention of criminal activity being the final product.
But due to the difficulty of measuring crime prevention we use the number of
"solutions" by type of crime as output measures. 1
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In the past few years a number of authors have addressed the problem of determining the structure of production in law enforcement agencies. Since under
certain rather mild regularity conditions there exists a duality between cost and
production functions, either the cost function or the production function may be
used to characterize the technological structure of a firm. The studies of Chapman,
Hirsch and Sonenblum [2], Ehrlich [10, II], Votey and Phillips [13, 19], and Wilson
and Boland [21] all proceed by estimating production functions while Popp and
Sebold [14] and Walzer [20] estimate cost functions. It is of some interest to briefly
review the findings of these authors.
Chapman, Hirsch and Sonenblum estimate a rather traditional production
function, at least from a theoretical point of view. All police outputs are collapsed
into one aggregate, which is then regressed on input use levels. They find strongly
increasing returns to scale - often a two to four percent output response to a one
percent change in input usage.
Ehrlich also uses an aggregate solution rate as the output measure, which he
regresses on per capita expenditures on police, the aggregate offense rate and a
series of exogenous ("environmental") variables. The expenditure variable is an

index of overall input use levels while the aggregate offense rate is included to
measure the effects of "crowding" or capacity constraints on output. This is a
substantial departure from a neoclassical approach in which the shape of the production function itself will reflect diminishing returns as capacity ispressed. But it is
a specification that has been widely adopted by those who have followed Ehrlich.
(For example, see Vandaele [18], Phillips and Votey [13], or Votey and Phillips [19].
Using per capita expenditures to measure the scale of output, Ehrlich finds that a
one percent increase in expenditures per capita leads to much less than a one
percent increase in the solution rate.
We should point out that two different arguments have been used for including
the offense level in police agency production functions. In addition to the argument
based upon police resource capacities, some authors have justified inclusion of the
offense level in the production function using what is essentially a "fisheries
argument". Viz., that the total number of fish in the ocean is a determinant of the
number caught. So if the number of offenses is high, then ceteris paribus, it should
be easier to obtain a solution that if there are but few offenses. Obviously, the
argument goes, if there are no offenses there can be no solutions. But this is really
not the question. The question is whether in the neighborhood of observed solution
levels, changes in the total number of offenses would change solution levels.
Whichever rationale is used, the neoclassical production function is modified
and written asy = f(vJ, v2, ... , Vm, 0), where y is the number of solutions, v; is the level
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appropriateness of this specification is to assume that 0 does not belong in the
production function and then estimate the functiony/0= j(VJ, V2, ... , Vm} 0"1, Where
y/0 is the solution rate. If y is significantly different from minus unity, the offense
level probably influcences solution levels. If not, one has some evidence that the
production function for solutions is independent of the level of offenses.
Phillips and Votey [13] report three estimates of the production function y/0 =
o"~. Using their reported parameter estimates and standard errors, one cannot
reject the hypothesis that y = -1 in any one of the estimated equations at the .05
level. In addition, Ehrlich's [II] estimate of y is -.908 which again is not
significantly different from minus unity. We conclude, at least tentatively, that the
production of solutions does not depend upon offenses and do not consider the
matter further in this study.
Similar to the work of Votey and Phillips [19], Wilson and Boland study the
production of solutions to several property crimes. But instead of input levels as
determinants of solutions, they utilize a "capacity" variable as well as variables
meant to account for productivity differences between departments. Here the
authors cannot address the question of scale economies due to the fact that only a
subset of all outputs are included in these studies.
Finally, both Popp and Sebold, and Walzer estimate cost functions and attempt
to measure scale economies. The former use population size in the police jurisdiction as their measure of "scale" along with a large number of demographic and
environmental variables to estimate the per capita costs of police service. The
authors find diseconomies of scale throughout the entire range of population sizes.
OJ course the population variable provides a considerably different concept of scale
than economists are accustomed to considering. In fact, Walzer has argued that

a.Jl

population size is a poor measure of scale for several reasons- the most important

being a tendency on the part of police administrators to determine manpower needs
as a proportion of population size. In such a case there is obviously a strong bias
toward constant returns to scale.
In his study, Walzer recognizes that offenses cleared, accidents investigated, etc.,

all make up the output of a police department. But instead of estimating a multiple
output cost function, he creates an "index of police service" by collapsing all
outputs into one. 2 The estimated cost function contains the offense rate as an
argument in addition to measures of input prices, input usage and several variables
meant to pick up externally determined differences in productivity. Using the
service index to measure output, Walzer finds evidence of economies of scale,
although they seem to be rather slight. Interestingly enough, he also finds that input
costs are not siguificantly related to overall production costs.
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II. OUTLINE OF THE PAPER
A number of strong hypotheses concerning the production structure of law enforcement agencies have been implicitly maintained in the studies sketched above.
First, the arguments entering cost and production functions have for the most part
differed considerably from what one would expect from classical production
theory. In addition, in the one case where input costs do enter the cost function
([20]), linear homogeneity in input costs has not been imposed on the estimated cost
function. One possible explanation for these deviations from classical theory is that
classical theory, and cost minimizing behavior in particular, is deemed not capable
of explaining observed choices in public agencies. While this is a plausible
hypothesis, it should be tested rather than maintained. 3
Second, each of the estimated production functions upon which we have
reported is either linear or linear logarithmic. Such functions may be viewed as first
order approximations to an arbitrary production function. It is well known that
first order approximations severely restrict admissible patterns of substitution

among inputs and admissible rates of transformation among outputs as well as
having other undesirable empirical implications.• In addition, linear logarithmic
functions do not permit scale economies to vary with output. We noted above that
each of the production studies surveyed included the offense rate or level as an
argument. A possible explanation for this inclusion might be based upon the
restrictiveness of the chosen functional forms and a consequent attempt on the part

of the authors to provide output responses which do vary with the scale of
operation, in functions which do not naturally possess this property. For these
reasons and others, we adopt a second order approximation to the underlying cost
and production structure thereby leaving the various elasticity measures of
common interest free to be determined by the data. 5
Third, the Chapman, Hirsch and Sonenblum, Walzer and Ehrlich studies all
utilize a single output aggregate. If the results of such aggregate studies are to be
used for decision purposes, it is desirable that the aggregate measure be a consistent
index over all police outputs. In what follows we estimate a multiple output cost
function and test whether the various subsets of outputs may be consistently
aggregated into single categories.
Fourth, the Wilson and Boland, Votey and Phillips, and Vandaele studies each
implicitly maintain the hypothesis of nonjoint outputs by estimating separate
production functions for different types of solutions. Again, instead of maintaining
this hypothesis we estimate a multiple output function and then test the
nonjointness hypothesis.
To summarize, in this study we characterize the structure of production in a
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the existence of consistent aggregate indices of police output, for nonjointness of
output, and for consistency of our estimated equations with the optimizing
behavior of classical theory. In addition, we calculate (I) marginal and average cost
functions for solutions to the property crimes of burglary, robbery, larceny and
motor vehicle theft, and for solution to crimes againstthe person; (2) marginal rates
of transformation between these activities; and· (3) an estimate of scale economies

based upon the response of total cost to simultaneous variation in all police
outputs.
III. MOTIVATION OF AGENCIES
In this section we provide a framework within which the structure of law enforcement production technology could be estimated. The model is essentially a
value maximization model and implies that input decisions are reached in cost
minimizing manner. we assume that police administrators, either implicitly or

explicitly, assign "seriousness" weights to crimes by type and use these weights
along with the costs of solving crimes by type to determine the solution mix. This
might be termed a "bounty hunter" 6 model of police decision making since
resources are allocated to solutions by type as if police remuneration were
proportional to the "value" of solved crimes and assumes that police decision
makers are primarily interested in solutions and not deterrence. We believe that on

a day to day basis a strong argument can be made that police administrators are
primarily concerned with solutions and not deterrence and that for property crimes
average values stolen are likely to be reasonable approximations to the weights used
in allocating resources to solving property crimes.
Using P; to represent the value to police of a solution of a crime of type i. the
police agency's decision problem is
n
(I)
max I
PiYi- C(y. w). 7
i=I

which provides the familiar system
(2)

P; -

ac;ay; = o

i

= 1,

2, ... , n.

These may be used as a basis for estimating C(y, w). Equation (2) instructs police
administrators to allocate resources to solving crimes of type i until the marginal
cost of a type i solution is equal to the assigned weight, P;. Note that if C(y, w) is
approximated with a polynomial in y and w, equations (2) alone may not be
sufficient to determine the cost function. This can be remedied by including C(y. w)
itself in the s stem to be estimated. In which case
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(3)

P; - ac/oy; = o,
C- C(y, w) = 0

i =I, 2, ... , n

becomes the system of interest. In the circumstances we have outlined it is reasonable to assume that values P; are determined jointly by the activities of police and
offenders in earlier periods- i.e., P; are predetermined. Assuming that input costs
are exogenous, equations (3) determine the n endogenous solution levels as
functions of exogenous and predetermined variables.
One problem in implementing this system in an econometric context is obvious:

The weights to be given the various types of solution are at best difficult to obtain.
But as we have indicated above, in the case of property crimes average values stolen
probably provide reasonable approximations to the seriousness of these crimes in
the eyes of the police. No such convenient measure is available for the case of
"crimes against the person". e.g., homocide, rape, and assault.

One method of dealing with this problem is to assume the property crime
solutions are separable8 from all other police activities. This is equivalent to
assuming that marginal rates of transformation (MRT) between solutions to all
pairs of property crimes be invariant to the level of nonproperty crime solutions,
and to the level of other police services provided, and to input prices. In this case, it
can be shown that there exists functions C* andfsuch that the cost function may be
written as

(4)

C = C*(f(yJ, ... ,yp. w), Yp+J, .. ., Yn· w)

where y;, ···Yp represent solutions to crimes against property and Yp+J, ... , Yn
represent solutions to crimes against the person and the service activities performed

by police. Equations (3) with this modification are estimated below for the case of
four property crimes, burglary, robbery, motor vehicle theft and larceny, an aggregate of crimes against the person and an aggregate police service indicator. 9
IV. THE TRANSLOG MODEL
From an econometric point of view equation system (3) is only oflimited interest
until a specific functional form has been assigned to the cost function C*(y, w). The
primary concern in choosing a functional form for c• is that the chosen class of
functions be capable of approximating the unknown cost function to the desired
degree of accuracy. In wide-spread use in the literature in the past few years are the
class of so called "flexible" functional forms which includes the generalized
Leontief function, the generalized Cobb-Douglas function, the transcendental
lo arithmic function and man h brids. 10 These functions rna all be viewed as

M.N. DARROUGH AND J.M. HEINEKE

182

particular place no restrictions on elasticities of substitution between inputs or
elasticities of transformation between outputs and allow returns to scale to vary
with the level of output. We have chosen to approximate C*(y, w) with the translog

function due primarily to the fact that most past studies oflaw enforcement agency
production technology have adopted linear logarithmic functions which are special
cases of the translog function.
The translog cost function may be written as
(5)

1nC(y, w)

n

n+m
% b;1nw;

1

n+1

= ao + %a;1ny; +

+ 112

n+m

!

ay1ny;1nyj

1 1

n+m

!

n n

+ 1/2 ! !

{3;j1nw;1nwj

n+1 n+1

+

n+m n
:S ! yy1ny;1nwj.

n+1 I

It can be shown that second order parameters ofthis function must be symmetric
if supply functions are to be well behaved, i.e., Ctij = etji and /3ij = /3ji. for all i and}
and "'ii = "/ji fori= 1, ... , nand}= n + 1, .. ., n + m. Our maintained hypothesis of

separability (see equation (4)) between property crime solutions and all other
activities of the police agency implies the following restrictions on equation (5):

(6)

Ciij = 0,

i

= 1,

2, .. ., p, j

= p + I,

p

+ 2,

... , n. 11

In general, hypotheses concerning the nature of production technology impose
certain restrictions on the values ofthe parameters ofthe empirical cost function. In
particular, the hypothesis of linear homogeneity of C(y, w) in input prices, which is
an implication of cost minimizing behavior, imposes the following restrictions on

the translog cost function:
(7)

n+m

n+m

!

n+1

b;

= 1, !

n+m

{3;j

j

= !

n+m

{3;j=! Yij=O.
i
j

If these restrictions are imposed, then proportional increases in input prices lead to
equi-proportional increases in production costs. The hypothesis of constant returns

to scale implies
(8)

n

n

i

j

! a;= 1, !

Ciij =

n

!

Ciij =

i

Another hypothesis of considerable interest is that of nonjointness of outputs. If
outputs are nonjoint one may estimate a separate cost function for each output. In
terms of the translo cost function a test for noniointness of outouts mav be based
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(9)

i, j = I. 2• ...• n, i #}.

These restrictions and others on the production technology of law enforcement
agencies are tested below .'2
V. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
In this section we specify the model to be estimated econometrically. We had
available for this study information on annual police budgets for the years 1968,
1969, 1971, and 1973 for a sample of approximately thirty medium size cities; 13 the
average wages of officers by rank, the number of crimes of type i cleared by arrest
("clearances") and the average value stolen for each of the property crimes in the
FBI index. The police budget and wage information was gathered by the Kansas
City Police Department and circulated for use by participating cities under the title
of the Annual General Administrative Survey. The data on clearances and average
values stolen are from unpublished sources at the FBI. We have used clearances by
arrest for the seven FBI "index crimes" as our measures of "solutions". In
particular, we have called burglary clearances (solutions}, YI. robbery clearances,
Y2. motor vehicle theft clearances, Y3, and larceny clearances, Y4. We have used the
aggregate number of homocide, rape and assault clearances to represent solutions
to crimes against the person and have labeled this output, Y5. Finally, a very large
component of the output of all law enforcement agencies are the rather mundane
but important service functions - directing traffic, investigating accidents,
breaking up fights, providing emergency first aid, etc. We group all such service
functions together as Y6. The question is whatto use to measure these activities. We
have adopted the hypothesis that the quantity of services of the type we have been
discussing is proportional to the size of the city (population) in which the agency is
located.
We had available wage information on eight grades of police officers from
patrolman to chief. As one might expect, these wage series are highly collinear. To
test for the existence of a Hicksian price index, we computed correlation
coefficients between the wages of the various ranks and found very high
coefficients. For example, the correlation between wages of patrolmen and a
weighted average of the wages of all other ranks is .955. Unfortunately, there does
not appear to be a way of testing whether a sample correlation is significantly
different from one since the distribution of this statistic is degenerate at that point.
But with correlations this high it appears safe to assume the conditions for Hicks'
aggregation are fulfilled and hence we use a weighted average of all police wages as
an aggregate measure of unit labor costs, denoted w.14
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The translog cost function of (5) above may now be written as a function of six
outputs and one input as follows
6
6 6
(10)
JnC*(y, w) = ao + '£ a;lny; + blnw + 1/2 '£ '£ ay Jny;lnyj
1
1 1
2

6

+ l/2{31nw + '£ -y;lnwlny;
1

where a15 = <Xl6 = <X25 = <X26 = a35 = tx36 = "45 = "46 = 0 due to the imposed
separability of property crime solutions from all other police activities.
Given the hypothesis of separability between property crime solutions and all
other police activities there are a total of eleven possible groupings of property
crime solutions which might be considered for indexing. 15 Our question here is not
whether an index exists in any of these cases, because an index can always be found,
but whether a consistent index exists. 16 It is important to keep in mind that the
existence of a separable group of outputs does not in general imply existence of a
consistent index for the group.
For the translog cost function, it is convenient to express equations (3) in the
following "value share" form:
(11)

6
P;y;/C* =a;+ '£ lXijlnYj + -y;lnw,
1

i = ], 2, 3, 4

6
6 6
2
6
InC*= ao + '£ a;lny; + blnw + 1/2 '£ '£ ay Jny;lnyj + J/2{31nw + '£ -y;lnwlny;
1
1
1 1
where aij = 0, for i = I. 2, 3, 4, j = 5, 6 and ay = <Xji, for all i and}. (The first four
equations here give the value of Yi solutions to property crime i as a proportion of
total police expenditures.) In order to provide a stochastic framework for equations
( 11), we append classical additive disturbances to each of the five equations in the
model. These disturbances arise either as a result of random error in the maximizing
behavior of police administrators, or as a result ofthe fact that the translog function
provides only an approximation of the "true" underlying production structure. We
assume that noncontemporaneous disturbances are uncorrelated both within and
across equations. We make no other assumptions about the distribution of
disturbances other than they be uncorrelated with right hand variables in each
equation. 17
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We have fitted the five e nations of s stem 11 under the stochastic s ecification
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in the system. Since no assumption has been made concerning the distribution of
disturbances, our estimation procedure may be thought of as multiequation,
nonlinear least squares. In the computations we used the Gauss-Newton method to
locate minima. The results of all estimations that are conditional upon cost
minimization are presented in Table 1.
The estimates reported in column two contain no restrictions other than
symmetry and homogeneity of C* in input prices and entails estimating twenty
parameters. Given the primarily cross section nature of the data, the model fits
2
quite well with R figures of.72 for the costfunction and .35, .13, .30, and .27 for the
value of solution equations p;y;IC*, i = I, 2, 3, 4, respectively.
In columns three, four, and five are reported parameter estimates for the cases of
nonjoint outputs, linear logarithmic costs and constant returns to scale, each
conditional on the cost minimization hypothesis. The restrictions of nonjointness
(Column three) reduce the number of parameters which must be directly estimated
to thirteen. (See equations (9).) The linear logarithmic cost function (Column four)
was estimated primarily to contrast our functional form with that implied by the
linear logarithmic production functions which have been estimated in the majority
of earlier papers. The total number of parameters to be estimated is now reduced to
seven.
Our tests of the various hypotheses are based upon the test statistic
R
R
(12)
A= max L /max L

where max LR is the maximum value of the likelihood function for the model with
restrictions Rand max LR is the maximum value of the likelihood function without
restriction. Minus twice the logarithm of A is asymptotically distributed as
chisquared with number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions
imposed. Logarithms of the likelihood function (lnL) are given in Table I for each
of the model specifications. Throughout we choose a critical region based upon the
.01 level of significance.
We now report the results of statistical tests performed on the estimated models.
The model was first estimated in unrestricted form conditional only upon the
maintained hypothesis of functional separability of property crime solutions from
other police activities. 18 We have contrasted this specification with the model
implied by cost minimization (i.e., the model with symmetry and linear
homogeneity of input prices imposed). Our interest here, of course, lies in
determining whether our sample is consistent with cost minimization (or more

generally with value maximization). Without the optimization hypothesis the
"share" equations of s stem II above are inter reted as the avera e observed)
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TABLE I
Parameter Estimates for Four Cost Models*
(Conditional Upon Cost Minimization)
Parameter

Oo
Q}

02
Q]

114
05

"6

b

au
0<22
a]]

0<44
0<55
0<66
0</2
0</3
0</4
0<23
0<24
0<]4
0<56

JnL

Symmetry &
Homogeneity

-114.974
(33.466)
-.0606
(.0166)
-.0068
(.0039)
-.0724
(.0216)
-.0327
(.0100)
-1.944
(1.210)
19.080
(5.291)
I
.0246
(.0020)
.0033
(.0004)
.0293
(.0024)
.0126
(.0009)
.0191
(.0524)
-1.461
(.4214)
-.0020
(.0006)
-.0064
(.0017)
-.0048
(.0010)
-.0003
(.0005)
.0013
(.0004)
-:0028
(.0010)
.1501
(.0997)
1633.58

Symmetry & Homo- Symmetry & Homo- Symmetry & Homogeneity & Constant
geneity & Nongeneity & Linear
Returns to Scale
joint Outputs
Logarithmic Costs

5.150
(4.201)
-.0794
(.0075)
-.0053
(.0011)
-.0771
(.0086)
-.0376
(.0035)
-.4885
(1.136)
.1020
(.0722)
I
.0235
(.0016)
.0031
(.0004)
.0298
(.0023)
.0127
(.0008)
-.0028
(.0535)
.0308
(.0468)
-.00042
(.00009)
-.00613
(.00075)
-.00299
(.00034)
-.00041
(.00009)
-.00020
(.00004)
-.00290
(.00037)
.04984
(.09617)
1620.66

-4.469
(1.092)
.0292
(.0016)
.0065
(.0003)
.0459
(.0026)
.0198
(.0009)
.2448
(.0376)
.9113
(.0902)
I

1483.57

-.5043
(1.307)
.0171
(.0021)
.0088
(.0007)
.0653
(.0031)
.0102
(.0013)
.4338
(.3991)
.4646
(.3992)
.0214
(.0015)
.0032
(.0004)
.0199
(.0020)
.0117
(.0007)
.0313
(.0607)
.0313
(.0607)
-.0027
(.0005)
-.0123
(.0015)
-.0063
(.0008)
-.0013
(.0004)
.0008
(.0003)
-.0062
(.0008)
-.0313
(.0607)
1600.13
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value of property crime solutions as functions of solution activity levels and as a
proportion of total agency budgets.
Symmetry and linear homogeneity in input prices impose fifteen restrictions in
addition to those imposed by the functional separability of property crime
2
solutions from all other police activity. The X • o1 critical value is 30.58. Minus
twice the logarithm of the likelihood ratio falls far into the critical region of the test.
Our sample appears to be inconsistent with cost minimizing (and consequently
value maximizing) behavior on the part of police decision makers. Nonetheless, as
we have indicated earlier, we will proceed with all other tests conditional upon the
cost minimization hypothesis. We have chosen this approach due first to the fact
that the translog cost function is but an approximation to the true cost structure
and hence in this sense our test result is only approximate; second, due to the fact
that our maintained hypothesis of functional separability of property crime
solutions from all other police activity is a strong assumption and could possibly
have distorted the result of our test; third, due to the fact that average values
transferred may not accurately reflect departmental evaluation of outputs; and
fourth, due to the fact that we are uncertain as to the power of the likelihood ratio
test in fmite samples. Finally we note that past studies indicate that tests of the
symmetry restriction tend to be very difficult to pass. Any one of these factors could
cause us to reject the structure implied by cost minimization when in fact it is true.
Of course, still another and perhaps more fundamental reason for proceeding
conditional upon cost minimization is the lack of interpretation and the
shallowness of explanation one must be content with once the behavioral
hypotheses underlying equation systems are abandoned.
Conditional upon cost minimization we next test the validity of the hypothesis of
nonjoint outputs - a hypothesis which has been maintained in a great many past
studies. The likelihood ratio statistic indicates that we must reject the hypothesis.
We conclude that one may not go about estimating separate production functions
or separate cost functions for each of the outputs of police agencies. The interaction
between outputs must be accounted for if one is to adequately characterize the
structure of cost and production in this "industry".
Contrasting the linear logarithmic structure implied by these data with our more
general model (columns four and two), we find that the linear logarithmic
specification is overwhelmingly rejected. The loss in explanatory power resulting
from adopting the Cobb-Douglass functional form for C* is obviously substantial.
We next test the hypothesis of constant returns to scale. Linear homogeneity in
outputs imposes seven additional restrictions on the model. The value of the test
statistic is 66.90 and hence these data lend no support to the constant returns
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We have estimated the models associated with each of the ten possible output
aggregates. As above, we test these hypotheses (aggregation by homothetic
separability) conditional on the validity of the cost minimization hypothesis via
likelihood ratio test. All potential aggregates are definitely rejected, although the
aggregate (YJ, y2, y.lj is only marginally rejected. Our sample does not support the
existence of a category function for any aggregate.
Even if the sufficient conditions for consistent aggregation of outputs via
homothetic separal:>ility are not met, another possibility for consistent aggregation
remains - the value of P may be perfectly correlated. We have calculated the
correlation matrix for P to check for the possibility of a Hicksian aggregate. The
correlations are r12 = .065, YJ3 = .065, TJ4 = .901. r23 = .197, r24 = .014 and Y34 =
0.026. (Of course, such calculations permit testing only pairwise groupings of
outputs in the first step.) The question here is whether .90 I is significantly different
from 1.0. It is not possible to test this proposition as the distribution of the sample
correlation coefficient is degenerate at 1.0. However, .90 I seems distant enough
from 1.0 to conclude that y 1 and Y4 may not be treated as a single output. We
conclude that the data in our sample does not support the existence of a consistent
output aggregate. Hence future efforts directed to estimating cost and production
functions for law enforcement should attempt to determine the appropriateness of
summing police outputs into aggregates prior to using such measures. 20
VII. MARGINAL COSTS, RATES OF TRANSPORMATION AND RETURNS
TO SCALE
The marginal cost function for activity i is given by oC*Ioy; = (o1nC*/o1ny;)
(C* ly;) and may be calculated using the formula
6
inc*
(13)
oC*Ioy; =(a;+:!: ay1nyj + -y;1nw) (e
ly;)
i = 1, 2, .. ., 5.
1

Equation ( 13) will be valid for each of the crime solving outputs, y J, Y2· ... Y5 but not
for Y6- Recall that the sixth output was an aggregate of the "non-crime solving"
services provided by police. Since we have postulated only that the production of
this output is proportional to population size, it will be possible to determine
oC*/i)y, only up to this faetor of proportionality.
The rate of transformation of output i for outputj gives the number of solutions
to crimes of type i which must be foregone for an additional solution to a crime of
type j; given fixed levels of all other outputs. Formally, the rate of transformation
between outputs i andj may be written as- oy;lilyj = (oC*Iilyj)l(oC*Ioy;), i, j = 1,
2, ... , 5, i # j, and may be calculated using the formula
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6

(aj

+ I C<jkinyk + 'Yjlnw)y;
I
6

(14)

i, j = I. 2, ... , 5, tF j.

(a;+ I a;kinyk
I

+ -y;lnw)yj

As with marginal cost functions, it will not be possible to obtain transformation
rates between output six and other outputs.
Traditional measures of scale economies (or diseconomies) are predicated on the
single output firm and must be modified for use here. We measure scale economies
as the inverse of the percentage response of costs to a small equal percentage change
in all outputs. That is, if
6

= dC*/C* = I

(15)

•

(16)

[C*(YI, ... , y;, ... , Y6· w) - C*(YJ, ... , min y;, ... , Y6, w)j/(y; -min yJ

(oinC*/oinyJ(dq/q),
I
where dq/q is the percentage change in outputs, then 1/< is the usual measure of
economies of scale. 21 <measures the percentage response of costs to an equal percentage change in all solutions and in the service output. 22
Defining average cost functions for the various outputs presents something of a
problem in the case of multiple output production structures. We have calculated
the average cost of solutions of type i by evaluating

-

-

--

---

where an over bar indicates a sample mean and min y; is the minimum sample value
of y;.23 This approach holds input prices and all outputs, except y;, constant and
yields the average value of the increment in costs over the region between the
minimum value of y; and the mean of y;.
In Table 2 we have evaluated the cost responsiveness function, <, marginal cost
functions, average cost functions, and marginal rates of transformation between
outputs at sample means.
We fmd that estimated marginal costs are lowest for solving larcenies at $353,
followed by those for robbery at $584, burglary at $786, motor vehicle solutions at
$3,065, and solutions to crimes against the person at $7,569. 24
Rates of transformation between outputs at sample meas range from .II between
motor vehicle theft solutions and larceny solutions to twenty-one between larceny
solutions and solutions to crimes against the person. Hence, the estimated cost
function predicts that on average it will be necessary to forego between eight and
nine larceny solutions to solve one additional motor vehicle theft (at the mean) and
approximately twenty-one larceny solutions to solve an additional crime against
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TABLE 2

Marginal and Average Costs of Outputs, Rates of Transformation and Cost
Responsiveness Function, ~. at Sample Means*
$

786.70

AC1

$

662.80

MC2

$

584.89

AC2

$

720.34

MRT13

MC3

$3,065.29

AC3

$ 3,367.77

MRT14

MCJ

MC4

$

353.94

AC4

MC5

$7,569.61

ACs

*Standard errors were calculated for

s 332.87
s 13,097.40

E and

MRT12

.743
3.82
.449

MRT24
MRT25
MRT34

.605
12.94

.liS

MRTJs

9.62

MRT35

2.47

MRT23

5.24

MRT45

21.39
1.083

for marginal cost functions. Each was highly significant at

the .01 level.

Similar interpretations hold for the other transformation rates.
Unit costs of clearing larcenies are $332, followed by burglary at $662,robbery at
$720, motor vehicle solutions at $3,367, and solutions to crimes against the person
at $13,097. Comparing marginal cost estimates with associated average costs,
indicates that marginal costs of solving robberies, auto thefts and crimes against the
person are below average costs and hence unit costs are falling (at the sample mean)
for these activities. Marginal costs are greater than average costs for solving
burglaries and larcenies, indicating rising unit costs (at the sample mean) for these
activities.
We have estimated the value of • to be 1.083, which turns out to be not significantly different from unity. But as Fig. I indicates, scale economies vary greatly
FIGURE 1

Cost Responsiveness: AI I Police Activities

1.62
1.00
.53
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over the sample with decreasing, then constant, then increasing returns to scale as

output levels increase. Sample values of <range from 1.62 to .53. To the extent that
small cities have low solution levels, it appears that "large" cities have technological advantages in the provision of police services.
In interpreting this finding one should keep in mind that the cities in our sample
range in size from approximately one third million to only a little over one million.
Therefore, one should not conclude that very large American cities experience
increasing returns to scale in the provision of police services, since scale diseconomies may appear as city size continues to increase. 25

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have adopted the economic model of an optimizing firm as a
framework for characterizing the production structure of a sample of medium sized
U.S. law enforcement agencies. Unlike previous studies we have begun with a
second order approximation to an arbitrary multi-output-multi-input production
possibilities function. This rather general functional specification has permitted us
to test a number of hypotheses which have been implicitly maintained in earlier
work. Of particular interest are the findings that, at least in our sample, the
decisions of police administrators seem to be inconsistent with cost minimization.

We also rejected the hypothesis of nonjoint production. We also found that our
sample did not support the existence of a consistent index for any one of the
possible sub-aggregates of outputs. These findings make explicit that the usual
aggregation of all police outputs into one measure or estimation of separate
production (cost) functions is accompanied by a loss of information. In addition,
we strongly rejected the hypothesis of constant returns to scale and found that scale
economies varied considerably with activity levels- which in tum pointed up the
inappropriateness of maintaining a Cobb-Douglas production structure in studies
of law enforcement production technology. All tests of functional structure were
performed conditional on cost minimizing behavior, although the same results are
forthcoming in tests against the unrestricted model.
Finally, we calculated returns to scale, marginal costs, average costs and
marginal rates of transformation at the sample mean. As always much work
remains to be done. Among the more challenging and potentially promising tasks is
to disaggregate the "crimes against the person" output and to incorporate these
variables directly into the decision problem underlying estimation. Initial work in
this area seems to indicate that unit costs for clearing homicides are an order of

magnitude greater than that of any other police activity.
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* A portion ofHeineke's participation in this study was supported under Grant# 75-NI-99-0 123 from
the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA, U.S. Department of Justice to
the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. We are especially grateful to Erwin Diewert and
Lawrence Lau fbr their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper. We have also
benefited from discussions with C. Blackorby, M.K. Block, and F. Nold. Points of view or opinions
stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or
policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
** The authors are Assistant Professor and Professor of Economics, University of Santa Clara,
California.
1 See Chapman, Hirsch, and Sonenblum [2] for an attempt to measure crime prevention as an output
of police agencies. In addition, see Shoup [15, pp. 115-18] and ihe references there cited.
2 The weights used are average times spent on each type of activity.
3 This hypothesis is explicit in Wilson and Boland, [21, p. 8,] who state, "In our view, police
departments do not behave in accordance with the economic model of the firm".
4 For example, linear logarithmic production functions imply input expenditure shares which are
independent of the level of expenditure, while linear production functions imply perfect input
substitutability and consequently rule out internal solutions to the cost minimization problem.
5
In the Popp and Sebold, and Walzer studies the production cost function is specified to be quadratic
in the scale argument although all other second order parameters are restricted to be zero.
6 M.K. Block has suggested this terminology which is particularly descriptive of the model.
7 Of course, there is a constraint on the decision problem which we have not taken into account: Viz.,
that C(y, w) ~A, where A is the agency's budget for the period.
8 See Darrough and Reineke [6] for a detailed discussion on theoretical background.
9 An alternative approach to estimating the production structure of law enforcement agencies would
be to assume that police take as given a vector of outputs which is minimally acceptable to the
community and provide at least that level of service at minimum cost. Among other reasons for choosing
the value maximization framework over the cost minimization framework is that the former explicitly
addresses the output mix problem rather assuming that this decision is exogenous. See Darrough and
Heineke [6] for more detail.
10 See Diewert [7, 8, 9], and Christensen, Jorgensen, and Lau [3, 4, 5].
11 An alternative means of imp.osing separability on the translog cost function exists, but is not
pursued here. See Darrough and Reineke [6] for more detail.
12 See Darrough and Heineke [6] and the accompanying references for further discussion of these
restrictions.
13 The largest city in our sample is Houston, Texas, ( l ,230,000), the smallest is Birmingham, Alabama
(300,000). Mean population over the sample is 561,000.
14 Cost and wage series have been deflated using an index based upon BLS Intermediate Family
Budget data. (See B.L.S. Bulletins No. 1570-7 and the Monthly Labor Review).
15
These groups are: (YJ, y;), (YJ. YJ), (YJ. Y4), (y;, YJ). (y;, Y4). (YJ. Y4), (YJ, Ylo YJ), (YJ, Ylo Y4). (YJ,
YJ. Y4), (y;, YJ, Y4). and (YJ. y;, YJ, Y4).)
16 An example of such a question is whether it is possible to aggregate burglary, robbery, and larceny
solutions into a composite category such as "non automobile theft'' solutions so that the aggregate index
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consistent indeX may be derived by Hicks' aggregation theorem (Hicks [12]) or a homothetically
separable production structure.
17
The latter is in fact a rather strong assumption which may be eliminated by using a set of
instrumental variables to generate "predicted" values of )1, say y1, and then replacingy1 with jJ; when
estimating system (11).
18 The value of lnL is 1696.65.
19
According to Table 2, returns to scale at the sample mean are 11£ = .923 which turns out to be not
significantly different from one. Obviously this does not imply constant returns to scale throughout the
relevant output region.
20
The hypotheses of nonjoint production, linear logarithmic costs, constant returns to scale, and
functional separability of the several aggregates were also tested against the unrestiricted model. In each
case these hypotheses were rejected.
21
E.g., if dq/q = l, and t < 1 at y*, then the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale at
the output mix y*, etc.
22
The proportionality between population size and y6 causes no problem in calculating returns to
scale since the percentage change in Y6 is equal to the percentage change in population size.
23 C*(y,w) ~ e lnC*(y,w)
24 Of course, the model insures that "on average" marginal costs are equal to values stolen. Notice
that this does not imply that marginal costs evaluated at the mean are equal "on average" to values
transferred. More importantly, our interest in this study is primarily in the structure oflaw enforcement
production technology and hence not local properties of marginal and average cost functions.
25 In the past few years there has been considerable discussion concerning the share of the total police
budget going to non-crime solving activities. All parties seem to agree that the share is high and has been
increasing. For example, unpublished studies by the Vera Institute of Justice and the Cincinnati Institute
of Justice indicate that police officers spend only about 15 to 20 percent of their time in crime solving
activities. To provide additional information on this point, we have calculated AC6 (Y, W) · ji(;!"C (Y. W) to
measure the budget share of activity six-non-crime solving activities. (This calculation assumes that unit
costs of these police services are approximately constant up to y 6 • See equation (16) above.) We find that
the budget share of non-crime solving activities is slightly more than 80 percent at the sample mean -a
result strikingly consistent with the studies mentioned.
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Summary: Law Enforcement Agencies as Multi-Product Firms: An Econometric Investigation ofProduction

Costs. - In this paper we have adopted the economic mode of an optimizing firm as a framework for
characterizing the production structure of a sample of medium sized U.S. law enforcement agencies. A
translog function is used to test hypotheses as to the nature of agency behavior as well as hypotheses
concerning the characteristics of the underlying production function. Our empirical tests have rejected
cost minimizing behavior, nonjoint production, the existence of sub-aggregates of outputs, and constant
returns to scale. We also calculated returns to scale, marginal costs, average costs, and marginal rates of
transformation at sample means.

Resume: Les organismes charges du respect des lois etudies en tant que firmes aproduction multiple: une
investigation econometrique des emits de production. No us utilisons dans cet article le modele i:conomique
de comportement d'optimisation de l'entreprise afin de caracti:riser Ia structure de production d'un
l:chantillon d'organismes, de taille moyenne, chargl:s du respect des lois aux Etats-Unis. Une fonction
..translog" est utilisi:e afm de tester les hypotheses quant a Ia nature du comportement des organismes
ainsi que les hypotheses relatives aux caractl:ristiques de Ia fonction de production sous-jacente. No tests
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!'existence de sous-agrCgats d'outputs et de rendements d'Cchelle constants. Nous avons aussicalcule les
rendements d'Cchelles,les coiits marginaux,les emits moyens et les taux marginaux de transformation
Ia moyenne Cchantillon.

a

Zusammenfassung: Po/izeibehOrden als Multi-Produkt-Unternehmen: Eine Okonometrische Untersuchung
der Produktionskosten. - In diesem Artikel wird das Okonomische Optimierungsmodell eines
Untemehmens als Rahmen iibemommen, urn die Produktionsstruktur einer Stichprobe von
PolizeibehOrden mittlerer GrOBe zu charakterisieren. Es wird eine "translog" Funktion verwendet, urn
sowohl Verhaltenshypothesen als auch die Charakteristika der zugrundeliegenden Produktionsfunlctionen dieser BehOrden zu untersuchen. Unsere empirischen untersuchungen wiesen kein
Kostenminimierungsverhalten, keine gemeinsame Produktion, keine Unteraggregate der Produktion
und keine konstanten Skalenertriige auf. Ebenso wurden Skalenertriige, Grenzkosten,
Durcbschnittskosten und Grenzraten der Transformation auf der Grundlage von Durchschnittswerten
berechnet.

